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The revitalization of Baltimore's Inner Harbor and waterfront is internationally recognized as a planning and
urban design model. This successful story started in the late 1950s with the Charles Center redevelopment plan
for the core of the Central Business Distric and its positive effects on the city's economy. In the first of a twopart article, Vicente del Rio writes about this early plan and its role in Baltimore's efforts towards a sustainable
revitalization. Next FOCUS will feature his account of the plan for the Inner Harbor and beyond.

I

have a long-standing fascination for Baltimore’s efforts in
revitalizating its downtown and, particularly, the waterfront.
In 1984 I had the chance to spend some time there, dividing
my attention between research and practice, and I was in
awe from the moment I arrived.1 As an urban design scholar
and practitioner, Baltimore was, and still is, one of the most
fascinating international examples of revitalization, place
making, waterfront redevelopment, and re-imaging. From
a run-down, decaying, and almost hopeless case of urban
neglect, economic exhaustion, and suburbanization, the city
raised from its ashes, rebuilt, and became a great place to live,
shop, recreate, and visit. Baltimore’s success in revitalizing its
Inner Harbor is heralded as an international model of success,
and is noted in all professional publications. Despite the social
and economic problems and downturns hitting Baltimore over
the years, it is one of the most attractive, dynamic, and fun
metropolitan cities in the US.
Notwithstanding Baltimore’s success with its downtown
and Inner Harbor, our field has not seen any comprehensive
publication on the planning process behind this success.
That realization came as a surprise to me when, in 2008, I
was invited to contribute to a book on the revitalization of
port areas for the City of Rio de Janeiro. At that time Rio was
immersed in strategic planning for the 2014 World Cup and
the 2016 Olympic Games, and downtown projects were
prioritized including the redevelopment of a long stretch of
the city’s historic port. Since leaving Baltimore in 1985 I visited
a couple of times and remained an interested observer, so I
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As a Senior Visiting Scholar with the Johns Hopkin's Center for
Metropolitan Research, and as a Visiting Urban Designer with the
City of Baltimore's Housing and Urban Renewal Department, from
August to December 1984.

gladly plunged into the article by updating my old records and
studies, reviewing the literature, and consulting with personal
connections there. My efforts led to a book chapter providing
a panoramic view of Baltimore’s fifty years of planning and
urban design efforts leading to the Inner Harbor success.2
However, having a publication in Portuguese limits its reach
and, encouraged by several colleagues, I decided to adapt it
for FOCUS.
My essay tells the story of Baltimore’s efforts towards reinventing its downtown and revitalizing its Inner Harbor and waterfront, and the several components of a vision that has been
consistent and sustainable enough to successfully incorporate
political interests, market forces, and community needs. But I
must warn the readers that this is not data-driven academic
work but a professional-oriented story from my personal perspective. And because my account of Baltimore’s fifty-plus
years of downtown revitalization efforts and successful projects is long, it will appear in FOCUS in two parts. In the current issue, the first part covers the initial steps in the late 1950s
with the Charles Center Renewal Plan. The second part, to appear in FOCUS next year, will cover the revitalization of the Inner Harbor and beyond. Hopefully, I will be able to show how
Baltimore managed to plan for a short and long-term strategy,
reverse an escalating number of problems affecting the downtown, and keep afloat as a feasible city. There are some important lessons in this story for planners and urban designers.

2

Organized for the City of Rio de Janeiro's Mayor office. See
"Baltimore, Inner Harbor" in V. Andreatta (ed.) Porto Maravilha - Rio
de Janeiro + Seis Casos de Sucesso de Revitalização Portuaria. Rio de
Janeiro: Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro / Casa da Palavra, 2010, pp. 22-61
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Sustainable Revitalization
In revitalizing cities and urban districts, planning and urban
design should be guided by a sustainable development
paradigm that is best represented, as suggested by Godschalk
(2004), by a pyramid with ecology, economy, and equity at the
base and livability at the top (Figure 1). On the one hand, this
paradigm recognizes that high-quality design interventions
are fundamental for sustainability. On the other hand, because
of declining public investment capabilities and the increasingly
globalized market space, cities are looking for flexible strategic
planning models that include public-private partnerships and
participatory practices as competitive advantages.
Strategic sustainable planning must be a way to think and
conceive urbanism, reflecting in the city as a whole and in its
various parts. As a decision-making process, it must constantly
be assessed by stakeholders, particularly the communities
directly impacted by the decisions (Marshall, 2001). Each
positive result contributes to the whole, feeding a sustainable
process and attracting new investments, residents, and
consumers that, in turn, generate additional projects and so
on. Sustainable revitalization of urban cores, specifically of
ports and waterfronts, has become archetypical of the postindustrial city, enabling cities to participate in a competitive
global market where national and local identities, and quality
of life are essential elements (del Rio, 1991; Shaw, 2001; Stevens,
2009). An important component of this complex sustainable
planning process is place making, place marketing, and the
constant monitoring of place quality (Kotler et al., 1993).
Baltimore’s Charles Center and Inner Harbor plans had the
National League of Cities Baltimore appoint Baltimore as the
most successful city in economic development (in Kotler,
Haider & Rein, 1993: 62). As with any competitive product at
the global level, the process of revitalizing central areas and
obsolete ports adopted a model that is, at the same time,
adaptable for both tourist and local consumption (Breen &
Rigby, 1993, 1996; Marshall, 2001; Stevens, 2009). Among
experiences of waterfront intervention and revitalization
in post-industrial cities, Baltimore’s Inner Harbor is a model
difficult to avoid (Busquets, 1995). According to the American
Institute of Architects (AIA), Baltimore’s Inner Harbor is “one
of the supreme achievements of large-scale urban design
and development in U.S. history” (Millspaugh, 2003). By 2000,
the Charles Center-Inner Harbor redevelopment plans had
received 45 national or international awards and the renowned
Frommer’s guide consistently picks Baltimore as one of the top
ten cities to visit in the United States.
The success of the Inner Harbor’s initiative, its positive effects
on the larger city, and its sustainability over time has made it
an international point of reference: a flexible initial plan, open
to community and private sector participation, a determined
city government and willing business partners, a smart
management structure, and quality urban planning led to the
place’s redevelopment and appreciation.

Livability

Equity

Ecology
Economy
Figure 1: The sustainability pyramid
(based on Godschalk, 2004).

The Historical Context
Following World War II, not unlike most US cities, Baltimore
started feeling the impacts of suburban development. Firstly,
the federal government was incentivizing new housing for
veterans returning from the war through cheap mortgages.
Secondly, the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 destined large
resources to highway construction to support the growth of
the automobile industry. In the case of Baltimore, estimates
indicate that most of the 30,000 returning veterans settled in
new suburban tract housing Olson (1997). However, although
Baltimore’s industrial base had expanded significantly during
the war efforts, it retracted in the post-war period and, by the
late 1940s, Baltimore’s industry had shrunk by 45,000 jobs
(Olson, 1997). Labour cuts, plant closings, and technological
reorganizations continued to hit Baltimore through the 1980s
(Merrifield, 2002). Between 1950 and 1960 the city lost 18,000
manufacturing jobs, and of the 1,738 manufacturing firms that
existed in the 1950s only 696 were left in 1984 (Levine, 1987;
Merrifield, 2002)
The pursuit of the American Dream of owning a home in
suburbia, the ease of moving around on the new highways,
and the deterioration of Baltimore’s industrial and economic
base, pushed the middle and upper class families out of the
city. With them went the shops, businesses, schools, hospitals,
and public institutions. Between 1950 and 1960 Baltimore’s
suburban population jumped from 270,000 to 492,000 (Warren
& McCarthy, 2002). Meanwhile, poorer populations with lower
mobility —mostly African-Americans that had unsteady or
lower paid jobs— stayed behind in the inner city with little or
no economic opportunities. While white families moved out,
real estate prices dropped significantly, and buildings became
rapidly susceptible to deterioration, facilitating poorer families
to move into older neighborhoods. The flight of families
and businesses to the suburbs together with the changing
economy led to a precipitous drop in Baltimore’s real estate
prices and tax base, leading to a spiralling effect of depression.
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While in the 1960s an average Baltimore resident was paying
twice the property tax than a suburbanite, the latter paid twice
as much income tax (Olson, 1997). This phenomenon, known
as “white flight”, had profound negative impacts on all large
cities in the US.
Although unsuccessful, Baltimore’s late 1940s attempt to deal
with its inner-city slums through zoning and code enforcement
became a model to many US cities (Hoffman, 2008). By the
1950s the effects of the “white-flight” on Baltimore’s city
core were huge: hundreds of lots had been vacant for over
fifteen years, 5,000 thousand buildings were either vacant
or deteriorated, 25,000 substandard residential units had
to be demolished, and poverty driven racial problems were
escalating since nine out of ten evicted residents were AfricanAmerican (Olson, 1997). In Baltimore alone, between 1951 and
1964, highway construction, urban renewal and other public
programs resulted in the displacement of 10,000 families of
which 90 percent were black (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989). By
the 1960s Baltimore was the leading US city in tearing down
old and poorly maintained buildings, causing violent traumas
to the evicted families and contributing significantly to the
escalating racial problems that culminated in the huge riots
and burning that shook the city in 1968.
By the 1950s the Inner Harbor, Baltimore’s main port area,
was also facing untenable conditions. Firstly, the old harbor’s
morphology, the encroaching city, and the obsolescence of
its facilities were severe obstacles to proper cargo handling
and storage, new terminals, and modern port operations
that increasingly relied on containerization. Secondly, the
antiquated street grid limited accessibility to the port seriously
impacting circulation and the movement of large trucks.
Finally, because of the Inner Harbor’s size and shallow waters –
both pluses for vessels in the past– Baltimore’s port was unable
to attract modern and large ships.
Depopulation, deindustrialization, and the inability to solve
the physical limitations of its port were lethal blows to
Baltimore’s harbor (Wrenn, 1983). By the late 1950s, thousands
of jobs had ceased to exist, and the maritime industry and
most commercial activities had abandoned the Inner Harbor.
Hundreds of warehouses and buildings were vacant, and the
desert streets were taken by filth and wrecked cars. Baltimore
became known as a city with a great past, but no future and
the deterioration of its downtown became the major cause of
the inferiority complex shared by Baltimoreans (Millspaugh,
2003; Pike, 2009).
The Seed for Revitalization: The Charles Center Plan
In 1954, Baltimore’s business community formed two important groups that would be immensily instrumental in the
long downtown revitalization process that was about to start:
the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) and the Committee for Downtown. Sharing the same economic goals, both
organizations were preoccupied with the decaying down-
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town and agreed on the need for a plan to reverse it. Among
these city champions was James Rouse, a local visionary
developer whose company was about to become a major
player in Boston’s and then Baltimore’s revitalization efforts.3
Although at that time Baltimore was facing strong competition
from the suburbs and commercial sales in the city had dropped
dramatically, the high office occupancy rate of 97% suggested
a strong potential for downtown redevelopment (Lang, 2005).
GBC’s planning council hired architect and planner David Wallace, former chief of planning for Philadelphia’s redevelopment
authority, to develop a plan for the Central Business District.4
Wallace would develop a strategic vision and quickly realized
that planning for downtown’s 125 hectares would take so long
that “the patient could die on the operating table while the
diagnosis was being determined” and decided to focus on a
short-term plan for a smaller area with the potential for immediate impact (Millspaugh 2003: 37; Wallace, 2004). Presented
in 1957 and adopted by the City, the Charles Center Plan was
the first focusing on the renewal of an American city core and
one of the most influential in the US (Whyte, 1988; Lang, 2005)
(Figure 2). It was the first plan to propose public-private partnerships, estimating a total of $140 million (in 1957 dollars) in
public investments (Bonnel, 1979; Millspaugh, 2003). A more
comprehensive, policy-oriented vision plan for the whole CBD
was only finished and approved in 1959, and included, for instance, the expansion of the University of Maryland downtown
campus and a new Central Retail Area, and the Inner Harbor as
a future redevelopment phase (Wallace, 2004). Regarding place
making, Kotler, Haider & Rein (1993: 333-334) point to the importance of Baltimore having a “comprehensive plan as well as
a one or two key ideas that captured the public’s imagination”.
Implementation of the Charles Center Plan started with the
approval of the plan and its 40-year urban development controls.
Rezoning the area and establishing it as an urban renewal
district followed shortly, opening the way for the city to use
eminent domain and to seek federal redevelopment grants. Plan
3

James Rouse’s biography is an interesting chapter on its own. An
incredibly active entrepeneur and a major player in Baltimore's
renaissance, Rouse believed that the market economy should have
a social conscience, a value that marked all his work life (Bloom,
2004; Olsen, 2004). He was a constant adviser to the US government
on urban and housing policy, and his company was responsible
for pioneering projects such as Columbia New Town in Maryland,
planned with racially integrated neighborhoods. Planning shopping
malls as gathering centers for the community in a context that
welcomed social and ethnic minorities, the Rouse Company invented
the festival mall concept that mixes retail, food and recreation, such
in Boston and Baltimore (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1991). James Rouse was
awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1995.

4

David Wallace was one of the most prolific and influential urban
designers and planners in the US, having received the AICP 2009
National Planning Pioneer Award. In the early 1960s he formed a
successful partnership with Ian McHarg, William Roberts, and Thomas
Todd (WMRT). In his professional memoir he discusses his long
involvement with Baltimore, including the Charles Center and Inner
Harbor plans (Wallace, 2004).
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implementation was handed over to a specially formed quasipublic non-profit entity, the Charles Center Management Office
The CCMO was the first of entity of its kind in the US and, acted
outside the city’s bureaucracy it made implementation easier,
more agile and flexible, proving fundamental for Charles
Center’s success. Later, the City would expand the CCMO's
responsibility to include the Inner Harbor area, transforming
it into the Charles Center / Inner Harbor Incorporate (CC-IH).
At its start, the CCMO had to deal with hundreds of parcel
acquisitions and assemblages, the relocation of 850 businesses
(who were moved back after the project was over), and
the continuous negotiations with dozens of city, state, and
federal agencies during planning, design, construction, and
maintenance phases (del Rio, 1985; Lang, 2005). Together with
the work of the CCMO, former president Martin Millspaugh
(2003) highlights the importance of GBC and the Committee
for Downtown’s work in organizing an enormous network of
contacts and efforts focused on carrying out the plan.
The Charles Center Plan covered a 22-acre (8.8 hectares) area
which redevelopment would leverage the revitalization of the
entire downtown (Millspaugh, 1964; Wallace, 2004). Departing
from the urban renewal model of the time, the plan resulted
from a wider comprehensive planning effort and its was more
careful with pre-existences, not imposing a clean slate, fitting
into the street grid and preserving four historic buildings
(Brambilla & Longo, 1979; Wallace, 2004; Lang, 2005). The plan
was praised by the general and professional media, even by
Figure 2: Charles Center original model superimposed on an
aerial photo. The Inner Harbor can be seen on the top of the
photo. (original photos by M. Warren; from a 1958 booklet
from the Greater Baltimore Committee, 1958)
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critics such as Jane Jacobs who called it “a new heart for the
downtown” in a 1958 article (Wallace, 2004: 18). In a letter to
James Rouse and the city, Jacobs noted that she liked the plazas
and the attention given to pedestrians, congratulating the city
for the plan being “less of a ‘project’ than an integral, continuous
part of the downtown” (Warren & McCarthy, 2002: 36).
The plan included three superblocks with eight office towers
and two through-streets running East-West (Figure 3). The
north superblock included Center Plaza —Charles Center major open space– several office buildings, ground-level retail and
eateries, and the Baltimore Gas & Electric Company and Fidelity historic buildings and a small corner plaza at the tip of the
block. In this superblock’s southeast corner site, One Charles
Figure 3: Major elements of the Charles Center Plan.
North Superblock
1 Residential towers
2 Baltimore Gas & Electric
3 Fidelity Building
4 One Charles Center
5 Central Plaza
Central Superblock
6 Omni Hotel
7 Lord Baltimore Hotel
8 Hamburgers Department Store
9 Baltimore & Ohio Building
South Superblock
10 Hopkins Plaza
11 Morris Mechanic Theatre
12 Federal Building
Outside the plan
13 Civic Center

1

2

3
5

4

8

6

9

7

11
13

10

12

FOCUS 13 ■

del Rio: From Downtown to the Inner Harbor

■ 65

Although most of the success of both Charles Center’s plazas
was certainly due to the lack of parks and open spaces in the
downtown, the spaces and the connections between them
and the buildings in the three superblocks were comfortable
and attractive for pedestrians and revealed nice vistas. Finally,
Charles Center’s original plan included two major modernistic
features to help link the three superblocks that reflected the
planners’ modernistic inspiration: a consolidated underground
parking structure for 4,000 cars and a series of pedestrian
bridges, as the planners wanted to take advantage of the site’s
68-foot drop. The idea for a single underground garage across
all Charles Center properties was dropped early because of the
numerous ownership and management problems to be dealt
with. Instead, each site would pursue its underground parking
solution.

Figure 4: The Center Plaza in the north superblock from the
pilotis area under One Charles Center. The "skywalk" system
starts here and can be seen in this photo. In the background, the
old Bromo-Seltzer Tower. (photo by the author, 1985)

Center, the plan’s first new office building, would be inaugurated in 1962. Facing one of the east-west streets, the Center
Plaza featured an oval-shaped space defined by landscaping,
seating, and a double line of small ornamental trees (Figure 4).
The plaza would become popular for public events such as the
flea market, and its location and size “made it appropriate for
big events such as the Baltimore City Fair, a popular event that
drew thousands in celebration of Baltimore’s neighborhoods”
(Warren & McCarthy, 2002: 38). When inaugurated in 1970, the
city fair attracted more than 200,000 people to Central Park
and continued doing so until moved to the Inner Harbor.
The smaller, central block included an Omni hotel (today a Sheraton), two small commercial buildings, and the Lord Baltimore
Hotel (today a Radisson) and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
historical buildings. Bridging over the other east-west street,
a three-stories department store connected north and central
blocks at their eastern-most corners. The south superblock, designed around Hopkins Plaza and its fountain, included three
private office buildings and was anchored by a theatre —the
plan’s only cultural facility—and the 460,000 square-feet Federal Building. Keeping the federal administration services —including the court house and immigration services—from building their new consolidated facilities in the suburbs was a major
victory for local planners and politicians, and fundamental for
the Charles Center Plan (Wallace, 2004; 36-37). According to
Warren & McCarthy (2002) note that, for many years, Hopkins
Plaza’s amphitheatre ambience surrounded by the theatre, the
raised platform of surrounding buildings, and the pedestrian
bridges made it popular for outdoor concerts. In the original
plan, under the south superblock, an underground transportation terminal would allow passengers to transfer to city buses.

A system of pedestrian bridges, nicknamed “skyway”, integrated with open spaces and promenades, was to make the pedestrian experience comfortable and separate from vehicular
traffic (see Figures 3 & 4). This system was like a spine linking
the middle of superblocks north to south and also meant to
help animate the second floors of buildings, particularly when
dedicated to retail. Starting at the Center Plaza, the pedestrian
bridge linked to the second floors of the Omni and Lord Baltimore hotels in the mid-superblock, and then to the Morris Mechanic Theatre and the Hopkins Plaza in the south superblock.
The south superblock was also bridged to the Civic Center on
the west and, in the following phase, to the block to the south
and beyond, eventually, the Inner Harbor.
Implementation and Changes to the Original Plan
In 1999, forty years after adoption and when its special redevelopment controls expired, we can consider that the Charles
Center Plan was successful in reaching its goals. David Wallace,
Charles Center’s chief urban planner, notes that “from an economic and fiscal point of view... it has been an outstanding success... turning the CBD from an urban disaster into a national
model” (Wallace, 2004: 32). Above all, Charles Center was as a
fundamental catalyst for the wider CBD plan and helped direct
revitalization towards the Inner Harbor.
The early formation of the CCMO (and its later expansion to
incorporate the Inner Harbor) with its effective pro-active work
was, without a doubt, fundamental for plan implementation
and respect for its vision, while pursuing public-private
partnerships and responding to market fluctuations. A
1989 study included Baltimore as one of the ten most
entrepreneurial and best manages cities in the US (Kotler,
Haider & Rein, 1993: 328). For instance, feasibility and market
studies led to three early changes to the original plan. Firstly,
the concept for a single consolidated underground garage
across the three superblocks was dropped out for each site
having is own solution. Secondly, the idea of an underground
transportation terminal in the south superblock was given
up but the Baltimore’s 1965 Area Mass Transportation Plan
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replaced it with a subway station. The subway line and station
serving Charles Center became operational in the early 1980s.
The third early major change to the plan affected the
top portion of the north superblock that had its land-use
converted from office to residential and a proposed mid-rise
parking structure stricken out. According to Wallace (2004),
the expansion of office uses in the CBD suggested the need
for upper-income apartments. The resulting two residential
towers with 400 apartments were offered, instead, to lowermiddle income families, the most evident demand at the time.
However, the towers did not do well and, by the 1990s, were
refurbished into upscale apartments plus a small shopping
center at the ground floor, responding to the growing demands
of downtown’s residential market (see number 3 in Figure 3).
All architectural projects in Charles Center had to comply
with the plan’s specifics and be submitted to an architectural
review board created by the City and the CCMO (Wallace, 2004).
The board created site-specific design guidelines that were
included in requests for proposals as conditions of sale to
guarantee “how each separate buildings was to fit into the place
as a whole and connect to its surroundings” (Wallace, 2004:
37). The same author notes that Baltimore’s practice became
a model for urban renewal projects funded by the federal
government. In 1959, Charles Center’s architectural review
board developed the guidelines for and supervised one of the
most important strategic decisions: a national competition
to choose a development proposal for the plan’s first office
building at a prominent corner site in the north superblock.
The competition for One Charles center was an effective
marketing strategy in attracting the attention of the national
media towards Baltimore’s redevelopment efforts and its
commitment to modernity through design. Presented by a
developer from Chicago, the winning project proposal was
designed by famous modernist architect Mies Van der Rohe.
Inaugurated in 1962, One Charles Center was Mies’s last
project before his death and it was typical of his well-known
International Style: a 23-story steel and dark glass tower on
columns, with great transparency on the ground floor and
dedicating most of it for a public plaza (Figure 5). The strategy
helped to raise the private investors’ confidence in the success
of the city’s redevelopment efforts. So much so that the
developer who came second in the competition with a project
by Marcel Breuer (another top modernist architect) assembled
a site across the street from One Charles Center and had an
office tower built first (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989; Wallace, 2004).
Fortunately, local demand for office use was strong enough,
and both were leased quickly, generating an important
demonstration effect.
By 1962, based on the recently approved master plan for the
CBD --also developed by Wallace and his group-- the City built a
Civic Center --now named 1st. Mariner Arena-- and an attached
parking structure with the hopes of attracting the public to
downtown events (see map in Figure 3). This was an important
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addition to the momentum created by Charles Center and
the revitalization of the CBD. Covering an entire 6-acre block
west of Charles Center’s south superblock and linked to it by
a pedestrian bridge, the Civic Center was designed by Pietro
Belluschi, another famous modernist architect at the time, for
14,000 sitting spectators. Over the years it hosted numerous
events such as basketball games, circus, monster trucks
shows, and concerts by bands such as the Beatles, Cream Led
Zeppelin, Grateful Dead, Jethro Tull, Bruce Springsteen, and
Beyonce. Although over the years the building went through
two major renovations, it has been a continuous success and
a money-maker. However, by 2014 the City was entertaining
proposals from private developers to redevelop the block
into a new, modern facility topped by a residential tower with
retail at street level. Located at walking distance from plenty
of parking, subway stations, and the Inner Harbor, this is a
strategic location and its redevelopment potential further,
demonstrates Baltimore’s CBD positive dynamics.
Figure 5: One Charles Center designed by Mies Van der Rohe, and
the Hamburgers department store spanning over Fayette Street
(demolished in the late 1980s). (photo by the author, 1985)
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By 1963, in addition to Mies’s office building, Charles Center
featured two new office buildings while six were in the
pipeline. By 1967, the south superblock had received two
major projects: the Federal Office Building and the 1,600seat Morris Mechanic Theater, the plan’s only cultural facility.
Anchoring the Hopkins Plaza and directly connected to the
skywalk system, the theater was built and named after a
local entrepreneur who had other such venues in Baltimore.
According to Wallace (2004: 35), originally Morris Mechanic
wanted Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier, or Philip Johnson
to design his building, but settled for brutalist architect John
Johansen whose “multi-use complex’s layer-cake of public
parking underground, retail on the first and theatre on the
second level, with different ownerships on each, was an
innovative legal as well as architectural creation” (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Getting to the south superblock from the "skywalk":
the Morris Mechanic Theatre on the left, Hopkins Plaza, and the
Federal Building in the background. (photo by the author, 1986)

Figure 7: The new design for Center Plaza includes four big lawns
and smaller planters, plenty of trees and seating, and a water
feature on its west edge. (photo from www.mahanrykiel.com)
Figure 8: The Hopkins Plaza in the south superblock in 2002 receiving
minor maintenance work, showing the Federal Building and an
access to underground parking. (photo by the author, 2002)

Unfortunately, the building’s architecture was never popular,
and the ground level retail was never strong enough, perhaps
due to the lack of residential use in the immediate vicinity besides the pull factor from the Inner Harbor. The Morris Mechanic
Theater remained Baltimore’s main venue for major plays and
Broadway acts until the early 1990s when its physical limitations started preventing larger contemporary acts. The theatre
closed in 2004, but its underground parking garage continued
to operate until the building was torn down in 2015 after local
preservationists failed in their attempt to have it granted landmark status. In 2016 the city approved a project for the site that
included two towers of 33 and 19 stories with 450 apartments,
restaurants and retail over five stories of underground parking
-taking advantage of the subway station in that location and
responding to the increasing demand for dowtown living.
After their initial success, neither of Charles Center’s two
main plazas were able to retain the dynamism originally envisioned by the planned, no doubt because of being surrounded mostly by offices and of the stronger pull of the
revitalized Inner Harbor and its parks. Center Plaza in the
north superblock, never recovered from losing its several seasonal public events to the Inner Harbor, and its arid
modernistic design became disfavored by the community.
It was renovated in 2007 and it now features extensive greenscaping, a water feature with a pool, movable seating, and nightlighting effects (Figure 7). In the south-superblock, Hopkins
Plaza had a similar fate due to the always weak retail around it
and the closing of the Mechanic Theatre (Figure 8). The Cultural
Landscape Foundation (n.d.) notes that “the introverted nature
of the plan was a built-in handicap and prevented the lively,
populous atmosphere envisioned by planners.” As major flaws,
they point to the placement of the two major plazas inside the
superblocks, the excessive hardscaping, the fixed seating, the
separate building ownership, and the fact that several of the office buildings had their own subsidized cafeterias discouraging
workers to lunch in the plazas.
The skywalk—the extensive system of pedestrian bridges
connecting the superblocks to the Inner Harbor—started to
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be dismantled in the late 1980s and none remains (Figure 8).
Time showed that people prefer to walk at street level, and the
prospect for a strong retail component on second floors never
happened (Whyte, 1988; Lang, 2005). Planner David Wallace
recognized this problem and noted that some of the skywalks
blocked views from the street into the plazas and they were
“circuitous and hard to find” (Wallace, 2004: 33).
By 1998, the plan’s retail building that spanned over a street
connecting the mid and north superblocks was torn down
after the original department store occupying it closed and its
“tunnel like” effect was recognized as too unpopular (Powell,
2011). Currently, the resulting north corner parcel has a onestory retail building with a roof-top plaza connected to One
Charles Center --the designed by Mies Van der Rohe building.
In the south corner parcel, a new three-story building holds
the Johns Hopkins University’s business school, whose MBAs,
part-time, and weekend courses generate significant activity.

Figure 8: Traversing the center superblock, the skywalk (now
demolished) along the Lord Baltimore (left) and Omni (right) hotels,
before getting to the south superblock by the theatre (left) and the
Federal Building (background). (photo by the author, 1986)

Figure 9: The Charles Center
area now; compare map and
legend to those in Figure 3.
(Aerial photo from Google Earth)
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Final Remarks - Towards the Inner Harbor
As noted by Lang (2005), although Charles Center adapted
to specific demands from clients, to the evolving property
market, and got considerably denser than the original plan,
it retained most of its qualities over the years. However,
although the Charles Center Plan had the right ingredients for
what, at the time, was thought to lead to a successful place,
its implementation revealed many of the shortcomings of
modernism that, in this case, can be grouped into three types:
land use, management, and design.
Firstly and above all, the lack of a live-in population impacted
the plan by not making its spaces lived in and dynamic
enough. The weight towards office and commercial uses in the
original plan not only reflected the trend of the time towards
implementing strick-line CBDs in central cities, but also the
only market demand that still existed in downtown Baltimore
in the mid-1950s as noted above. The plan even innovated, if
compared to others of that era, by including two residential
towers in the north superblock. However, all the other buildings
in Charles Center and its surroundings remained exclusively
non-residential until the late 1980s when the revitalization of
the Inner Harbor started to ripple back to the downtown. The
mixed-use project replacing the Mechanic Theatre and the
proposed to redevelopment the old Civic Center block should
generate almost 1,000 new apartments and increase the roundthe-clock usage of Charles Center. Another land-use problem
derived from the number of single-company office buildings
with their own cafeterias that discouraged employees to eat
outside and help in the dynamics of the plazas.
Regarding management, problems seem to have happened at
two levels. The first, higher level of problems was caused by the
lack of a tighter and more comprehensive planning process
that could consider the negativities that the success of each
new plan or initiative could cause on the previous. Although
it was Charles Center’s success that leveraged the Baltimore’s
efforts throughout the CBD and the redevelopment of the
Inner Harbor, once the waterfront was recuperated it became
too much of a “seductive competitor” (Wallace, 2004: 32). The
second level of management problems occurred, as pointed
out by The Cultural Landscape Foundation (n.d.), because
the city government did not retain ownership of the system
of open spaces and exterior infrastructure but for the three
plazas, so their treatment, management, and maintenance
were up to individual building owners and tenants.
The third and last type of problems are related to design. As
Wallace (2004) and other observers recognized, the Charles
Center Plan suffers from the introverted lay-out, the lack of
design coherence, the failure of the skywalk system, and the
poor architectural solutions of many of the buildings. On this
last problem, based on his professional experience, Wallace
(2004) notes that no matter how good the urban design
guidelines, you still need good architects to produce good
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design and a memorable place. Frieden & Sagalyn (1989: 42)
were more negative noting that Charles Center’s superblocks
structure was more appropriate to the suburbs, fitting
poorly with the surrounding context and adding little to the
attractiveness of the downtown.
However, the future and integrity of the Charles Center Plan may
be at risk. As David Wallace (2004) pointed out in his memoirs,
since Charles Center’s 40-year design and redevelopment
controls expired in 1999 and the current downtown zoning
ordinance allows a 14 FAR (floor area ratio), market pressures
and developers’ proposals to intensify development may lead
the city to drastic changes to the original concepts.
The early success and repercussions of Charles Center encouraged the City to follow the planners and the GBC’s recommendation and expand revitalization efforts to another phase, focusing on the much larger area to the south known as Inner
Harbor. Covering a 240-acre one-block deep area around the
harbor’s edge, the Inner Harbor Project I Urban Renewal Plan
was presented in 1964 and adopted by the city and the federal
government as in 1967. The Inner Harbor plan was an almost
instant success and, by creating a new, strong connection between Baltimore and its waterfront, it revealed untapped potentials that generated economic, recreational impacts and
ripple effects much larger than expected.
Together, Charles Center and the Inner Harbor plans prove the
importance of sustainable revitalization for Baltimore's livability efforts. But the story of Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, and the
conclusion for this two-part article, will have to wait until next
year’s FOCUS.

Note
The author thanks William Siembieda (Cal Poly), Ivor Samuels
(Oxford), and Jay Brodie (president, Baltimore Development
Corporation) for their helpful comments, as well as the support
and images provided by Paul Dombrowski (director of planning
and design, Baltimore Development Corporation).
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